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Abstract In this paper, we examine the impact of parental giving on the trans-
fer behavior of adult children to family members and community institutions
using unique data from the Indonesian Family Life Surveys. Our findings point
to persistence of private transfer networks across generations. In particular,
the community transfer decisions of adults living outside origin households
are positively influenced by the origin household’s community giving. We
also investigate the relationship between household transfers to family and
community networks. We find that unobserved heterogeneity in giving to
family members and community organizations is positively correlated, suggest-
ing important complementarities between transfer networks.
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1 Introduction
Understanding what leads individuals to transfer resources to those outside
one’s immediate family is a fundamental issue within social sciences. In this pa-
per, we present new evidence on two understudied aspects of private transfer
behavior. First, we investigate the role of the family in shaping transfer choices
across generations. There are several mechanisms through which patterns of
giving may be correlated across parents and their adult children. Children
may learn about giving to the family and to community organizations by
observing their parents’ behavior at an early age and retain these habits when
they establish their own households. It is also possible that parents attempt
to directly shape children’s preferences towards giving to the family or to
the community through their actions (Cox and Stark 1998; Jellal and Wolff
2000). Parental influences in giving behavior may also arise because income
and wealth tend to be highly correlated among family members (Grawe and
Mulligan 2002). Finally, correlations in parent–child transfer behavior may be
attributed to shared tastes and preferences.
Second, we focus on the relationship between transfers to family and
community networks and investigate empirically whether transfers to family
and community networks are substitutes or complements. In a seminal paper,
Becker (1974) provides a framework for studying interactions between giving
to family and giving to community organizations. Despite a growing literature
on private transfers, there exists a large gap in knowledge concerning the
relationship between transfer networks.1 Family and community networks
may be substitutes if both networks provide similar services such as mutual
insurance and credit to households (Banfield 1958; Fukuyama 1995; Putnam
1993). However, giving to family and giving to community networks may
be complementary due to altruism, common tastes for generosity (some of
which are unobservable to the researcher), and other factors, such as resource
constraints, social norms, technology, and shocks (Coleman 1990; LaFerrara
2003). Both types of transfer behavior may be motivated by exchange and/or
“warm glow” considerations (Andreoni 1990). Since there are theoretical
arguments for both the substitutable and complementary nature of the two
networks, the true nature of their relationship is ultimately an empirical
question.
The empirical analysis in this paper is based on new data from the Indonesia
Family Life Surveys (IFLS). The IFLS data are unique because they contain
detailed information on transfers to family members and transfers to commu-
nity institutions. We are unaware of other household surveys (either from a de-
veloped or developing country source) that can provide such a comprehensive
picture of both family- and community-level transfer networks. For example,
most household surveys from developing countries emphasize transfers among
1Recent studies have analyzed either private transfers to family members (Altonji et al. 1997) or
private contributions to charitable institutions (Auten et al. 2002; Andreoni et al. 2003).
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family members and provide very little information on transfers to community
organizations. In contrast, surveys from developed countries often provide
extensive information on transfers to community institutions but offer a less
complete view of family-based transfer networks. To explore parental role in
transfer choices (family vs community), we link a sample of adults living on
their own in 1997/1998 to their origin households in 1993/1994.
Indonesia represents a rich institutional environment to study the connec-
tions between family and community networks, with its diverse population
of nearly 250 million. Unlike many developed countries, public transfers in
Indonesia tend to be limited in scope, and few tax-related incentives for
transfer behavior exist. Both family and community networks perform im-
portant roles in Indonesia. Vital services, including health care, child care,
and old-age support are mainly provided through family and community
networks. Presumably, these services can be complementary in nature. For
example, in the health sector, Frankenberg and Thomas (2001) discuss the role
of neighborhood health posts (posyandu) in delivering key health services.2
Health care provided by the family may complement these services. However,
informal insurance may be an area where the services provided by the two
networks are substitutable in nature. The descriptive literature suggests that
family and community networks often interact in important ways in informal
insurance and credit markets.3 A household that resides in a community with
well-functioning community insurance mechanisms may have a reduced need
for extensive familial transfers, in which case community and family networks
would be substitutes rather than complements.
We adopt a novel econometric approach, which recognizes the interdepen-
dence of transfer amounts to family and community within generations and
fully accounts for correlations in the error structure of the transfer equations
across generations. Specifically, we estimate a quadrivariate system of Tobit
simultaneous equations using full-information maximum simulated likelihood
(MSL). This allows us to explore the relationship between transfers to the
family and transfers to the community. By taking into account the endogeneity
of giving across generations, we are able to determine if parental influences
persist after we have controlled for the indirect effects of unobservables,
including shared budget constraints, common shocks, and tastes within the
family.
Our results on transfer behavior suggest that parental giving has an impor-
tant effect on the transfer behavior of adult children. However, estimation
methods, which do not account for the endogeneity of parental giving, can yield
2Through the INPRES desa (Village Development Program), the central government provided
funds for the construction of health clinics (posyandus). Communities, in turn, were expected
to provide volunteer labor, building materials, and monetary resources for use with central
government transfers.
3Several authors have studied systems of private networks of support and mutual assistance that
exist in developing countries (see Alderman and Paxson 1992; Cox and Jimenez 1990; Morduch
1999 for a detailed review of this literature.)
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a naive picture of parental effects within family networks. Results on giving to
the community suggest a positive correlation across generations, with larger
parental effects after we have controlled for endogeneity of parental giving.
We find that unobserved heterogeneity in family and community giving tends
to be (weakly) positively correlated within a generation.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we provide a conceptual
framework to our study including some background on family and community
networks in Indonesia. In Section 3, we describe the econometric model,
estimation techniques, and some computational issues. We describe the data




Indonesia is somewhat unique in its centralized system of community organi-
zations. This allows us to study patterns of contributions because organizations
are comparable across regions. In Appendix A, we present evidence on the rel-
ative importance of specific community organizations based on the incidence
of transfers.4 In our data, households may contribute time, money, or materials
to a community meeting, a women’s group, an irrigation association (subuk),
a neighborhood security arrangement, rice cooperatives, and neighborhood
health posts (posyandu)—all these groups can be classified as community-level
organizations.
2.2 The role of the family in shaping transfers to family
and community organizations
Our first empirical question is whether parents’ participation in family and
community networks affects their children’s participation in such networks.
A growing literature emphasizes that the family can play an important role in
the transmission of social norms, preferences, and knowledge about networks
across generations—thus influencing the weights that children place on giving
to family and community networks.5 For example, a young child may observe
4Our data do not include religious or purely social groups—and these are not included in our
analysis. Our study focuses mainly on monetary transfers due to concerns that time transfers are
more likely to be measured with error. We should also note that household heads may report
contributions to more than one community organization.
5Cox and Stark (1998) provide an influential model of intergenerational family transfers, termed
the “demonstration effect” in which parents send transfers to their (elderly) parents, in order to
shape their children’s preferences, and to ensure that they will receive old-age support from their
children (see also Arrondel and Masson 2001; Jellal and Wolff 2000). However, parental actions
may shape the transfer behavior of their adult children even in cases where children’s transfer
choices do not yield clear parental benefits.
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parents being generous to family members, and this induces that child to
be more generous to family (and, perhaps, to community members) as an
adult. We adopt the term “role model” to capture the direct effect that
parental behavior can have on the transfer decisions of adult children. Role
model effects potentially cover both social learning and imitation. However,
we recognize that parent–child correlations in transfer behavior may also be
due to common family characteristics, rather than role model effects. For
example, common endowments, technology, and shocks (some of which are
unobservable to the researcher) may lead to parent–child correlations in
transfer behavior. Economic theory provides an important role for preferences
and budget constraints in the household’s transfer choice. If individuals learn
only from their own experiences, then transfer choices may be unrelated across
generations after we have controlled for the role of budget constraints and
shocks. However, preferences may be shaped by parents who serve as role
models for their adult children, which would lead to correlations in transfer
choices across parents and their adult children living outside their household
of origin.
The transmission of norms and values across generations may occur for a
variety of reasons. Parents may transfer social norms to their children out
of a sense of obligation to share knowledge about the benefits and costs
of transfer networks, even where parents do not benefit directly from the
children’s transfer choices. Furthermore, preference shaping and transmission
of norms may not always be intentional. Children may simply imitate their
parents and adopt their patterns of transfer behavior when they establish their
own households.
Next, we present a simple model in which parents serve as role models.
Children start out with no initial knowledge (k0) on the net benefits of making
transfers within a given transfer network. Let j refer to a network such that
j ∈ { f, o}, where f represents the family network and o represents the network
of community organizations. Information accumulation is a function of pa-
rental inputs P j, a key aspect of which is parents’ transfers to network j,
and external sources of knowledge, E j. In the equation below, the parameter
a j, measures an individual’s specific capacity at a given age i to learn about
transfer network j.
Following Chiteji and Stafford (1999), in simple linear form, we postulate
that the child’s knowledge of net benefits from participating in a given transfer
network, ċ j, are given as follows:
ċ j = a j Pji + E ji − δk j (1)
Suppose that this process operates over the period prior to when the child
forms his or her own household, and this knowledge in conjunction with
income and other variables shapes the network participation decision of the
child when he forms his own household. In other words, the derived demand
for services from network j is s j and is a function of knowledge on the net
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benefits on network j, and a vector of observed and unobserved individual
characteristics, such as income, and demographic characteristics (Z ) .





We will assume that derived demand for services from network j is increas-
ing in knowledge on that network (S1 > 0) . In the presence of role model
effects, then a j > 0 and
∂k j
∂ Pj













> 0 ; ∂t j
∂ Pj
> 0 (3)
In other words, if parental transfer choices and other parental actions
provide information on the net benefits of participating in social networks,
then we expect that transfer choices of children will be significantly correlated
with those of their parents. We recognize that household wealth, shocks,
demographic variables, and external influences such as religious and commu-
nity influences can also affect transfer choices. Some of these factors are less
measurable by the researcher, which means that it is important to account for
the unobserved factors that may indirectly affect transfers to a given network.
2.3 The relationship between family and community networks
within a generation
Our second empirical question is whether transfers to family and transfers
to the community are related. Private transfers to family members and/or
community organizations may be motivated by altruism or exchange consider-
ations. The “warm glow” motive, in which individuals derive intrinsic benefits
from their contributions to family members or the community, has also been
used to explain private transfers (Andreoni 1990). Within the exchange frame-
work, whether transfer networks can be regarded as substitutes, complements,
or unrelated will depend on the relationship between the services provided by
the family network and the community network, respectively.
With altruism, individuals transfer resources because they care about the
welfare of the family and community members. Under exchange consider-
ations, family and community networks can provide important current and
future economic benefits such as insurance and credit and mutual labor
exchange, as well as noneconomic benefits such as caring, social status, and
group membership. Existing research suggests that private transfers of income
and in-kind services within the family cannot be explained by simple models of
altruism (Cox 1987; Altonji et al. 1997). However, there is much less evidence
on the motivations for transfers to community organizations. Okten and Osili
(2002) find evidence for the exchange motive in their study of transfers to
community organizations in Indonesia.
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3 Econometric framework
In this section, we present an econometric model, which consists of a system
of four transfer equations—two for each generation of a given household
(denoted parents and children). Each of the transfer equations for a given
generation represents giving to the family and to the community, respectively.
We present the transfer equations in detail below. Our econometric framework
is designed to incorporate the following features. First, we investigate role
model effects by incorporating the transfers of parents as covariates in the
transfer equations of their adult children and allowing for correlated errors
across generations. It is also important to account for the fact that giving
with a given network may be correlated across generations due to unobserved
income and wealth, prices, and network characteristics. In general, estimates
of role model effects in transfer behavior may be biased if we ignore the
correlation in the error terms across generations. Consistent with theoretical
models of private transfers and our conceptual framework, we assume that,
while giving by parents may influence the giving of their adult children (living
in separate households), the reverse is not true.6 Second, we allow for the
possibility of transfers to family and community organizations being substitutes
or complements depending on the relationship between the services provided
by the family and community networks, respectively. Specifically, the error
terms for the equations for transfers to family and transfers to community
organizations may be correlated within each generation. Finally, transfers to
family and community networks are specified as latent processes because they
are censored in a significant number of cases. In particular, when zero transfers
are observed, we are unable to determine whether the household has chosen
not to transfer resources or whether transfers were not sent in the survey
period. The Tobit-based specification we have chosen is an attempt to allow
for censoring and distinguish between the decision to transfer and the amount
transferred.
3.1 Model




cf , and y
∗
co denote the latent propensities to give financial
transfers by parents p and their children c to other members of their families
f and to community organizations o, respectively. The observation subscript is
omitted for notational convenience. Let ygr, where generation g = (p, c) and
recipient r = ( f, o) denote the observed outcome that is related to the latent
variable by ygr = y∗gr if y∗gr > 0, ygr = 0 if y∗gr ≤ 0. In the empirical analysis
below, we use the labels, parents and children, to describe the relationship
between two related generations of households. It is important to note that the
IFLS data on origin households and their split-offs contain mostly biological
6We explore the implications of this assumption in the empirical section of the paper.
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child–parent pairs but also includes, more broadly, other adult family members
who have left their household of origin and established their own households.
Let
y∗pf = xpβpf + upf + εpf (4)
and
y∗po = xpβpo + upo + εpo (5)
describe the latent processes underlying transfers by parents to family and
community, respectively. xp is a vector of parent household characteristics
such as income, age, sex, urban residence, and other variables, and εpr and
upr, where r = ( f, o), are error terms described in detail below. The latent
processes for transfers to family and community by children are given by
y∗cf = xcβcf + ypf δ f f + ypoδcf + ucf + εcf (6)
and
y∗co = xcβco + ypf δ f c + ypoδcc + uco + εco, (7)
respectively. xc is a vector of child-household characteristics, including age,
sex, urban residence, and other variables; εcr and ucr, r = ( f, o) are error terms.
Parental or role model effects are assumed to be transmitted via the amounts
of transfers by parents, ypf and ypo, which enter the children’s latent processes.
The parameters associated with the transfer-variables are denoted by δ.
As shown in Eqs. 4–7, the error term in each equation is decomposed into
two parts. The εgr, g = (p, c) and r = ( f, o) are assumed to be mutually inde-
pendent and are drawn from unit normal distributions. We assume εgr has unit
variance because the variances of ugr and εgr cannot be separately identified.
Furthermore, we assume that ugr and εgr are independent of each other for
each g and r. Common unobserved heterogeneity between recipient types
within generations, between generations within recipient types, and between
recipient types, across generations is captured by correlations between the ugr.
We assume that u = [upf upo ucf uco]′ follows N(0, ) where 0 is a 4 × 1 vector






σpfpf σpfpo σpf cf σpf co
σpfpo σpopo σpocf σpoco
σpf cf σpocf σcf cf σcf co






7This matrix is symmetric by definition but is not necessarily positive definite. Because it is a
covariance matrix, it should be positive definite and symmetric. We check positive definiteness of
 at each iteration of the estimation algorithm using its eigenvalues. Parameters are forced away
from the invalid region using a penalty function. In practice, our experience is that nonpositive
definiteness of  is not an issue. In preliminary work, we also estimated models in which, instead of
specifying  directly, we specified a lower triangular matrix  such that  = ′. This formulation
ensures a symmetric and positive definite  and a unique  for any . Although estimates of 
were stable, we found the implied values of  to be less stable than our preferred parametrization.
Giving to family versus giving to the community within and across generations 1099
Conditional on ugr, the structure of each equation is in the form of a Tobit
and the joint likelihood L|u is the product of each of the marginal likelihoods















(ypr − xpβpr − upr)2
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where the (ygr = 0) and (ygr > 0) subscripts denote the limit and nonlimit
observations, respectively, and  is the standard normal distribution function.
In the empirical implementation, when transfers are positive, we use their
logarithms as the observed outcomes.
The expression in Eq. 9 cannot be maximized directly because the ugr are
unknown. However, since the distribution of u has been specified, it can be




(L|u) f (u)du. (10)
The integral above is over the domain of a quadrivariate normal density and,
thus, does not have a closed form. Therefore, the likelihood function cannot
be calculated analytically. The MSL approach is a powerful way to implement
maximum likelihood when the likelihood function does not have analytical
representation (Lee 1992; Gourieroux and Monfort 1996). The key insight of
the method is that the integral expression in Eq. 10 may be written as the
expectation expression,
L = E(L|u) (11)
with respect to the density of u, f (u). The MSL estimator involves replacing






where ũs is the sth draw (from a total of S draws) of a four-vector of random
numbers from the density N(0, ) and L̃ denotes the simulated likelihood.
8Ideally, it would be preferable to allow our explanatory variables to affect the decision to transfer
resources differently than their effects on the amounts transferred. Such a system might be based
on a set of generalized Tobit equations, for example, with a probit equation for the decision
to transfer and a linear equation for the amounts transferred conditional on positive transfers.
However, because our sample size is relatively small, we found such a system to be computationally
infeasible.
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Provided that S is sufficiently large, maximization of the simulated likelihood
is equivalent to maximizing the likelihood. In cases of multidimensional ex-
pectations such as ours, a large number of pseudorandom draws is required to
achieve suitable levels of accuracy. Instead, we implement a new acceleration
technique using quasirandom draws based on Halton sequences (Bhatt 2001;
Train 2002).
We maximize the simulated likelihood using a quasi-Newton algorithm
requiring only first derivatives. Once convergence is achieved, the covariance
matrix of the MSL estimates is obtained using the robust sandwich formula
because it correctly incorporates simulation noise, while other formulae do not
(McFadden and Train 2000).
3.2 Identification
In principle, the system of Tobit equations is parametrically identified with-
out any exclusion restrictions. We do not rely on parametric identification,
however, as our conceptual framework provides natural exclusion restrictions.
Parent-household characteristics, which enter the parent equations but not
the child equations, are the sources of identifying information. We have also
considered less restrictive models in which some parent characteristics, but
not all, are included in the child equations. One such model, which includes
parents’ household expenditure (or income) in the children’s equations, is
substantively important, and this is described in more detail below.
In each of these specifications, we find that the excluded instruments
are highly jointly significant, i.e., they are relevant. There are, however, no
standard overidentification tests in the context of nonlinear simultaneous
equations models such as ours. Nevertheless, to provide evidence on the
exogeneity of the instruments, we conduct Hansen’s test for overidentification
in linear simultaneous equations models (the J-statistic) estimated separately
for giving to family and giving to community organizations. The null hypothesis
of exogeneity was not rejected in any of the specifications we considered.
4 Data
The empirical analysis in this paper is based on data from the IFLS, conducted
by RAND and the University of Indonesia. The IFLS data are particularly
well suited for the study of transfer choices within family and community
networks. As mentioned earlier, data sources that provide microlevel evidence
on transfers to both family members and community organizations are rela-
tively scarce. The IFLS survey was first conducted in 1993/1994 (IFLS1), with
a follow-up in 1997/1998 (IFLS2), and contains about 7,500 households. We
focus on the second wave of the survey because only limited information
on transfer networks is available in the first wave of the survey (IFLS1).
In addition, the IFLS2 survey contains approximately 767 pairs of origin
households and their split offs, which allows us to examine role model effects
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in transfer choices.9 The origin–split off pairs are mainly composed of parent
heads of the households and their adult children who have established their
own households (Appendix B). For this reason, we maintain the labels parents
and children to describe the relationship between the two generations of the
IFLS1 household.
To investigate parental or role model effects in transfer behavior, we use a
matched sample of origin household or “parents” and their split offs or “chil-
dren” in the second wave of the survey (IFLS2). Adults who were residing with
their origin household in 1993/1994 (IFLS1) but have since established their
own households comprise the child sample. This matched sample provides
direct measures of transfers within family- and community-based networks for
both parent households and their children living outside the household.
We face some data limitations in studying intergenerational linkages in
transfer behavior because detailed information on family and community
transfer choices for parent households and their children is only available for
1997/1998 (IFLS2).10 Ideally, information on family and community transfers
for parent households prior to the time period in which the child establishes
his or her own household would also be useful in studying role model effects.
Data from a single time period are likely to provide an imperfect measure of
the importance of role model effects in transfer behavior. With these caveats
in mind, we proceed to discuss transfers to family and community networks
and characteristics of the parent household and child samples.
The main dependent variables of interest are financial transfers within the
family and within the community network. Our measure of “giving to the
community network” is defined as the log of total monetary transfer (in rupiah)
to community organizations in the 12 months preceding the interview. In the
empirical analysis, data on transfers to siblings and to the community are
measured for the head of the household. We define “giving to the family”
as the log of total monetary transfer (in rupiah) to all siblings living outside
the household in the 12 months preceding the interview. In the postindepen-
dence era, official government literature has emphasized gotong royong, or
community participation, as a central part of Indonesia’s national development
strategy (Bowen 1986).11 Individuals are asked detailed questions about their
9See Frankenberg and Thomas (2000) for a detailed description of the IFLS surveys. The joint
parent–child sample is limited to households for which the “sent transfers to family” variable is
not missing.
10We find very low correlations in community transfer decisions between IFLS1 and IFLS2, and we
attribute this low observed correlation (r = 0.02) to significant differences in the survey instrument
on community transfers across the two waves of the survey.
11To accomplish this end, the government promoted the adoption of a uniform system of local
government (through village councils and neighborhood organizations) across Indonesia’s 27
provinces. Thus, in key sectors of community and village life, such as education and health, the
production and delivery of services relied on a common framework of local government.
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contributions (cash, materials, and time transfers) to family members and to
specific community organizations.12
Recent studies highlight the importance of family transfers and coresidence
in Indonesia (Cameron and Cobb-Clark 2006). Our preferred measure of
giving within the family network is total transfers to siblings because other
types of family transfers (notably, transfers to parents and children) are more
likely to be affected by endogeneity bias. In particular, we only observe upward
transfers (child to parent) or downward transfers (parent to child) for non-
coresiding parents and children living outside the household. Since parental
coresidence and the number of children residing within the household may be
endogenous choice variables within the context of parent–child transfers, we
focus on sibling transfers. However, we also examine the robustness of our
results using a broader view of family giving, which includes both transfers to
parents and siblings. A major strength of the IFLS data is their inclusion of
detailed information on family members living outside the household.
Table 1 provides an overview of individual, family, and community variables
used in our analysis. Community organizations in Indonesia provide a range
of local public goods – health care, sanitation, irrigation, and neighborhood
security – in addition to performing safety net functions. Community orga-
nizations often provide services that do not have clear market substitutes.
For example, through contributions to community meetings, households may
gain access to mutual insurance and credit and obtain in-kind assistance with
household/farm chores and child care. However, from the onset, we should
note that some of the services provided by community organizations can
also be provided by family members and through networks of friends, kin,
and coworkers. In Appendix A, we present descriptive evidence on giving
to community organizations. We also provide detailed information on the
relative importance of specific community organizations based on whether
heads of origin households and split households contribute to these organi-
zations. We should also note that household heads may contribute to more
than one community organization. For both origin and split household heads,
contributions to community meetings are an important way of participating in
the community network.13
Our measure of giving within transfer networks has some limitations. We
classify individuals as participating in a network only if they transfer resources
in the survey period. This measure may not reflect both transfer history
and future participation decisions. Ideally, we would like to measure net
12In our sample, community organizations are largely economic in orientation. In this way, our
focus differs from other studies that have examined participation in social, religious, and political
groups.
13There are a few notable differences in contribution patterns of origin and split households. For
example, contributions to women’s groups are more prevalent for split individuals than for origin
households. Part of the explanation may lie in differences in gender of the household head. From
Table 1, while origin heads are more likely to be male (77%), male headship is less common in the
split households.
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Table 1 Summary statistics
Parent sample Kid sample (adults who
(origin—1993 IFLS1 have left origin households




Sent transfer to siblings 0.36 0.47
(in Rupiah)
Total transfer to siblings 32,000.83 (180,671.20) 42,853.85 (126,449.10)
(in Rupiah)
Sent transfer to community 0.23 0.16
(in Rupiah)
Total transfer to community 11,849.86 (105,076.80) 3,438.25 (25,283.70)
(in Rupiah)
Individual characteristics
Age 52.13 (12.99) 29.81 (12.81)
Marital status (married = 1) 0.77 (0.42) 0.72 (0.45)
Male (=1) 0.79 0.45
Religion (Muslim = 1) 0.91 0.92
Years of schooling 5.46 (4.28) 7.97 (4.01)
Per capita household expenditure 177,484.50 (260,008.00) 198,734.70 (206,124.50)
(in Rupiah)
Household size 7.21 (2.97) 3.74 (1.99)





Number of surviving parents 0.48 (0.69) 1.50 (0.71)
Parent coresiding? 0.05 0.12
Sibling characteristics
Number of economically active 4.45 (3.17) 3.84 (2.94)
siblings
Number of observations = 767. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses (kids are defined as
adults who have left their original IFLS1 household and have established their own households
since 1993). Parent sample (kid sample) is restricted to those households for which “Sent transfers
to Sibling” variable is not missing.
transfers to family and community networks. However, the IFLS2 survey asks
whether individuals received specific types of benefits (money, goods, other)
from community organizations but does not provide the monetary value of
benefits received from the community network. Clotfelter (1992) discusses
further problems associated with measuring benefits received from community
organizations.14 It is also possible to expand our definition of giving within
a network to include time transfers; however, time transfers are often less
precisely measured, particularly within the family network.
14Benefits may not be tangible goods and services that can be observed by the researcher.
Furthermore, benefits from community organizations may only become apparent over a much
longer time horizon.
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To measure household economic resources for parent and child house-
holds, we rely on annual per capita household expenditure (which includes
both market-purchased consumption and home-produced consumption). This
measure of household resources can be described as an approximation to
the household’s average lifetime income or permanent income. Alternative
measures of household’s economic position, such as per capita annual income,
are highly affected by temporary shocks and fluctuations. We also note that
the accurate estimates of the market value of household assets may be difficult
to construct where markets for land and housing are less developed, and this
may be the case for many rural households in our sample. Nevertheless, we
examine sensitivity to alternate measures of household resources in a series of
robustness checks.
4.1 Parent household
We include variables that capture the socioeconomic and demographic charac-
teristics of the head of the parent or origin household, including age, sex, years
of schooling, marital status, gender, and religion (Muslim = 1). Household size,
number of children, and per-capita expenditure in the household are used to
capture resources and constraints within the household that may influence the
individual’s participation in giving within the family or community network.
Table 1 also presents summary statistics for each generation. From Table 1,
the mean age for parent household heads in our sample is over 50. Parent
household heads are also more likely to be married (about 77% of these
heads are married.) To control for regional variation in our data, we construct
province dummies. Province dummies reflect differences in ecological envi-
ronments, resource endowments, population density, and other sociocultural
variation across regions.
4.2 Child household
From Table 1, the child sample is composed of younger individuals (the mean
age here is 29.81 years compared to the origin household sample, where the
average age is 52.13 years). Household heads in the child sample are slightly
less likely to be married (about 70% of the child sample is married), and have
higher levels of educational attainment compared to the parent household
sample. The average number of economically active siblings is slightly higher
for the parent households (the average number of siblings is 3.84 for the child
sample vs 4.45 for the parent household head).
We note that there are interesting differences in transfer variables between
the child and parent samples. Nearly half of the child sample reports making
a transfer to siblings, while only 36% of parent households report a sibling
transfer. When we examine community transfers, however, a different picture
emerges. In particular, parent households have a higher incidence of participa-
tion in the community network (23% of parent household heads vs 16% of the
child sample report making a community transfer).
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5 Results
Our results are based on a system of Tobit equations as described above. Pa-
rameter estimates along with robust standard errors are reported in Tables 2,
3, and 4. Giving within a family (community) network is defined as the log
monetary transfer to siblings (community institutions) during the survey year.
As discussed earlier, we focus on sibling transfers as our key measure of giving
within the family network because other types of family transfers – notably,
transfers between parents and children – are more likely to be affected by
sample selection bias. We begin by briefly discussing results from a model that
assumes exogeneity of origin household transfers. Next, we describe results
from the model that allow for endogeneity of origin household transfers.
We end this section by describing some substantively important specification
checks.
5.1 Estimates (assuming exogeneity of origin household transfers)
In the empirical work, we first investigate the role of the family in shaping
transfer choices. When parent household transfers are assumed exogenous
(Table 2), the parent household impact (or role model effect) on transfers
to family members is negative but statistically insignificant. However, we do
find evidence for a positive and statistically significant role model effect for
transfers within the community network. We note that parental transfers are
likely to be an endogenous variable within the child’s transfer equation. In
the next section, we investigate whether these results persist after accounting
for the endogeneity of parent household transfer behavior. The issue of endo-
geneity is an important one here because there may be common unobserved
heterogeneity in the transfer equations of parents and their children.
We also investigate the correlation between giving to family and community
networks. The correlation between the error terms in the transfer equations for
giving to the family and giving to the community is 0.05 for each of the parent
and child samples. After we have accounted for household expenditure and
other observables, common unobserved variables including lifetime wealth,
tastes, shocks, and prices may induce a positive correlation between transfers
to family and community for parent households.
5.2 Estimates (with endogeneity of origin household transfers)
In Table 3, we find that accounting for the endogeneity of parent transfers
leads to a positive and significant parental effect in family giving for the child
sample. A 10% increase in the origin household’s family transfer amount is
associated with a 1.6% increase in family giving for children living outside
the origin household. Thus, when we allow for the endogeneity of the origin
household’s transfer choices, we obtain a strikingly different picture in that
there is a positive and significant parental effect on children’s transfers to
family members.
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Table 4 Correlations of unobserved heterogeneity components
upf upo ucf uco









ucf −0.15 0.02 1
(0.0003) (0.0002)
uco 0.31 0.05 0.05 1
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Number of observations 767
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The superscripts (p, k) refer to the generation of the
household, parent and kid household, respectively. The superscripts ( f, c) refer to the recipient
type, family and community, respectively.
Our results on giving to the community also suggest a positive and significant
parental role model effect on the community transfer decision. The origin
household effect on community giving appears to be larger in the simultaneous
equations model that takes into account the endogeneity of origin house-
hold transfers. A 10% increase in the origin household’s community transfer
amount is associated with a 3.4% increase in community transfers for adults
living outside the origin household. Interestingly, parent’s transfers to the
family also have a negative and statistically significant effect on children’s
giving to the community. This result provides some evidence that family
giving may crowd-out giving to the community across generations. In addition,
parental giving to the community has a negative but insignificant effect on
the child’s giving to the family. We should note that results presented above
suggest that estimation methods that do not account for correlations in error
terms across generations may lead to a downward bias in the magnitude of the
“role model” effect.
Our results in Table 3 indicate that household resources are a positive
and statistically significant determinant of transfers within family networks
and community transfers.15 However, for parent households, we find that an
15We have also used household assets per capita and per capita household income (rather
than expenditure) to capture household resources. Our estimates suggest that these alternative
measures do not perform as well as per capita household expenditures based on a log likelihood
comparison.
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increase in per capita household expenditure has a larger positive effect on
family transfers. We also find that marital status has a positive and statistically
significant effect on family and community transfers. There are some important
differences, however, for the child sample. In particular, we find that older
households are more likely to transfer resources to family members for child
households, while the effect is not significant for parent households. This may
be explained by the differences in the demographic composition of the parent
and child samples.
Estimates of the covariance structure of the four unobserved heterogeneity
components of our empirical model are presented in Table 4. All estimates
reported here are statistically significant. The results indicate that the cor-
relation between the error terms in the transfer equations within a given
generation for giving to the family and giving to the community is 0.06
for the parent household and 0.05 for the child sample. This supports our
earlier findings that the unobserved heterogeneity components in family and
community transfer decisions are positively correlated, although this corre-
lation appears to be relatively weak. We also note that all but one of the
correlations in error terms are positive. For example, the correlation in the
error term for parents’ family giving is positively correlated with children’s
giving to the community (ρ = 0.31). A positive correlation in error terms may
be attributed to a positive correlation in unobserved wealth across generations.
However, the correlation in the error terms for the family giving equation
is negative across generations (ρ = −0.15) and statistically significant at the
1% level. A plausible explanation (as discussed earlier) is that sibling char-
acteristics, some of which are unobserved in our analysis, may be negatively
correlated across generations. These results emphasize the need to account
for unobserved heterogeneity in estimating parental influences in transfer
behavior. In our estimation, accounting for the endogeneity of parental
giving does lead to striking differences in our estimates of parental or role
model effects.
5.3 Additional specification checks
Although we have reported on a number of specification checks previously,
a few additional ones deserve attention. The first of these examines whether
there are differences in behavior for children who are biological children of the
IFLS1 origin household head as compared to those who are other members
of the origin household. The IFLS data allow us to identify the individual’s
relationship to the original IFLS1 household. About 54% of the child sample
is composed of biological children of the IFLS1 household head. One check
simply involves adding a dummy variable for a child of the household head
in our model. This dummy variable is not statistically significant. Another
check allows for the possibility that effects of other covariates may be different
across children and “nonchildren” groups. We construct a likelihood ratio
test analogous to the Chow test for linear models and fail to reject the null
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hypothesis that the coefficient vectors are the same for children of the IFLS
household vs other individuals in the split sample.
Our second specification check examines the issue of self-selection in
migration choice. In the above analysis, we compare transfer patterns for
parent households and their children or split-offs. However, we recognize that
this sample of individuals who have moved from their origin households and
established their own households (child sample) may not be homogeneous.
Specifically, our split-off sample is composed of two groups: individuals who
have moved outside the village/town where the origin household resides
(about 54% of the child sample) and those that have remained within the
same village/town as the origin household.16 A related concern is that children
who reside in the same communities as their parents may be subject to
common aggregate shocks—and both households may increase their transfers
in response to community-level shocks.
To deal with this concern, we introduce an indicator variable (same com-
munity = 1) in order to capture whether a child household resides in the
same community as the parent household. We find that this dummy variable
is statistically insignificant for family transfers for both the split sample and
the origin household. We also conduct a likelihood ratio test for parameter
differences in family transfers for individuals that no longer reside in the same
community as their parent household. An unrestricted model, which allows for
different coefficients for individuals that have moved vs those individuals that
have remained in the same community as the parent household is compared
with the restricted model (which contains the full sample). The likelihood
ratio test fails to reject the null hypothesis of no structural change for the
two subsets of the child sample. We should note that the dummy variable
approach and likelihood ratio test do not provide evidence for a location
effect in community giving, in that child households that reside in the same
community (as the parent household) do not give larger community transfers,
holding other variables constant.
The final specification check examines the role of parental income in child
transfer behavior. The econometric framework adopted in Section 4 assumes
that parental characteristics affect the child’s behavior only through parent’s
transfer behavior (the role model, or parental effect). This assumption imposes
restrictions on the parameter estimation and can be tested against a less
restrictive approach. To investigate the validity of our assumption, we include
parental household expenditure per capita as an additional regressor in the
child’s giving equation, which allows us to test whether parental expenditure
16For individuals who reside outside the village or town of their origin household, family- and
community-level shocks and constraints are less likely to be correlated. Since migration is an
endogenous choice, an additional concern is that kids who reside in a different community from
their parent household may have different tastes, wealth, unobserved ability, strength of family
ties, and other variables that affect transfer behavior. For example, as distance from the parent
household increases, the costs of sending family transfers may be higher.
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affects child’s giving (an “indirect” effect) and if role model effects persist once
we have controlled for parental expenditure in the child’s transfer equation.
Our findings suggest that parental expenditure has a positive but statistically
insignificant effect on child’s transfers to the family and community. In ad-
dition, the inclusion of parental expenditure as an additional regressor in
the child’s transfer equation does not significantly reduce the point estimates
associated with the effect of parental transfer behavior on child’s giving.
However, the standard errors on the coefficients for parental giving are larger,
which decreases the significance level of the role model effect (parental giving
remains significantly associated with the child’s giving at the 10% level for
sibling transfers and at the 5% level for community giving).
6 Policy implications of results
The relationship between family and community networks within and across
generations, usually discussed under the rubric of “social capital,” has gained
increasing attention within the social science literature. In developing coun-
tries, where publicly provided safety nets tend to be limited in scope, house-
holds rely heavily on private transfers. Cox and Jimenez (1990) estimate that
private transfers constitute 2% to 20% of income using household data from
five developing countries. The results on “role model” effects in transfer
behavior suggest that children learn important lessons about participating in
both family and community networks within the family. This is an important
insight for policy makers in both developing and developed countries that seek
to expand the role of community-based organizations.17
The second set of results focus on the relationship between family and
community networks may also provide some implications for policy makers.
Specifically, identifying the relationship between transfer networks can influ-
ence the design and implementation of government support for community
organizations. One crucial question then is the likely impact of government
involvement on family and community networks. For example, if the govern-
ment provides community organizations with grants, for income redistribution,
will these grants displace contributions to both family and community organi-
zations – the “crowding out” hypothesis – and, if so, to what extent? Crowding
out effects will largely depend on the relationship between family and com-
munity networks. If family networks and community-level networks are close
substitutes, then policies that provide funding to community organizations may
17For example, in the USA, government policies, including the faith-based and community
initiatives since 2001, have promoted the expansion of community organizations. Policymakers in
Europe and Canada have also discussed the role of community-based organizations in promoting
voluntary and civic behavior.
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reduce households’ contributions to both networks.18 In contrast, where family
and community networks are more complementary, government grants to
community organizations may increase the demand for services from family.19
In addition, because the results indicate that giving to family and community
networks tends to be related across generations, even small displacements in
family- and community-level mechanisms for providing income redistribution
may have an impact on the willingness of future generations to contribute to
family and community networks.
7 Conclusion
This paper contributes to existing knowledge on the relationship between
family and community networks, both within and across generations. First, we
investigate the role of family in shaping transfer choices across generations.
The results provide evidence in support of origin household influences or
role model effects in family and community giving. Our findings point to
the strength and persistence of private transfer networks across generations.
In particular, the community transfer decisions of adults living outside their
households of origin appear to be positively influenced by the origin house-
hold’s community giving.
Second, we also examine the relationship between transfers to family and to
community networks and investigate empirically whether transfers to family
and community networks are substitutes or complements. Results from the
IFLS provide significant evidence that unobserved heterogeneity in giving to
family members and community organizations is positively correlated for par-
ents and their adult children. This result suggests that important complemen-
tarities exist between transfer networks; however, more research is needed to
provide a better understanding of relationships between family and community
networks across various economic environments. Further research may also
be needed to investigate what role governments can play in supporting both
family and community-based networks to minimize crowding out of existing
private transfer networks.
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Appendix A: Contributions to community organizations
Parent households: Origin heads, matched sample, N20 = 158
Membership distribution21 : community meeting 31%, neighborhood improve-
ment 22%, volunteer labor 15%, neighborhood security 9.5% water and









20 N denotes the number of households that have contributed to a community organization.
21We define membership as the decision to contribute monetarily to a community organization.
For example, 33% of all households contribute to the community meeting for both parent and kid
samples. Note that a household may contribute to more than one community organization.
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Kid households: Split sample, N = 146
Membership distribution: community meeting 33%, neighborhood improve-
ment 16%, volunteer labor 14%, community health post 13%, women’s groups
8%, neighborhood security 7%, water and sanitation 5%, cooperative (coop)










Appendix B: Relationship to the origin household head in IFLS1
Kid households
Relationship to the head N = 767
of the origin household in 1993 Percent of the sample
Child of origin head 53.72
Son/daughter-in-law of origin head 16.04
Sibling 6.39




Giving to family versus giving to the community within and across generations 1115
References
Alderman H, Paxson CH (1992) Do the poor insure? A synthesis of the literature on risk and
consumption in developing countries. World Bank, Washington, DC
Altonji JG, Hayashi F, Kotlikoff L (1997) Parental altruism and inter vivos transfers: theory and
evidence. J Polit Econ 105(6):1121–1166
Andreoni J (1990) Impure altruism and donations to public goods: a theory of warm-glow giving?
Econ J 100(401):464–477
Andreoni J, Brown E, Rischall I (2003) Charitable giving by married couples: who decides and
why does it matter? J Hum Resour 38(1):111–133
Arrondel L, Masson A (2001) Family transfers involving three generations. Scand J Econ
103(3):415–443
Auten G, Sieg H, Clotfelter C (2002) Charitable giving, income and taxes: an analysis of panel
data. Am Econ Rev 92(1):371–382
Banfield EC (1958) The moral basis of a backward society. Free Press, New York
Becker GS (1974) A theory of social interactions. J Polit Econ 82(6):1063–1093
Bhatt CR (2001) Quasi-random maximum simulated likelihood estimation of the mixed multino-
mial Logit model. Transp Res Part B Methodol 35:677–693
Bowen J (1986) On the political construction of tradition: Gotong Royong in Indonesia. J Asian
Stud 45(3):545–561
Cameron L, Cobb-Clark D (2006) Do coresidency and financial transfers from the children
reduce the need for elderly parents to work in developing countries? J Popul Econ.
doi:10.1007/s00148-006-0105-8
Chiteji NS, Stafford FP (1999) Portfolio choices of parents and their children as young adults: asset
accumulation by African-American families. Am Econ Rev 89(2):377–380
Clotfelter CT (ed) (1992) Who benefits from the non profit sector? The University of Chicago
Press, Chicago
Cox D (1987) Motives for private income transfers. J Polit Econ 95(3):508–546
Cox D, Jimenez E (1990) Achieving social objectives through private transfers: a review. World
Bank Res Obs 5(2):205–218
Cox D, Stark O (1998) Intergenerational transfers and the demonstration effect. Department of
Economics Working Paper 329, Boston College, Chestnut Hill
Coleman J (1990) Foundations of social theory. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Frankenberg E, Thomas D (2000) The Indonesia family life survey (IFLS): study design and results
from waves 1 and 2. RAND, Santa Monica (DRU-2238/1-NIA/NICHD)
Frankenberg E, Thomas D (2001) Women’s health and pregnancy outcomes: do services make a
difference? Demography 38(2):253–265
Fukuyama F (1995) Trust. Free Press, New York
Grawe ND, Mulligan CB (2002) Economic interpretations of intergenerational correlations.
J Econ Perspect 16(3):45–58
Gouriéroux C, Monfort A (1996) Simulation based econometrics methods. Oxford University
Press, New York
Jellal M, Wolff F (2000) Shaping intergenerational relationships: the demonstration effect. Econ
Lett 68(3):255–261
LaFerrara E (2003) Kin groups and reciprocity: a model of credit transactions in Ghana. Am Econ
Rev 93(5):1730–1751
Lee L (1992) On efficiency of methods of simulated moments and maximum simulated likelihood
estimation of discrete response models. Econom Theory 8(4):518–552
McFadden D, Train K (2000) Mixed MNL models for discrete response. J Appl Econ 15(5):
447–470
Morduch J (1999) Between the state and the market: can informal insurance patch the safety.
World Bank Res Obs 14(2):187–207
Okten C, Osili UO (2002) Contributions in heterogeneous communities: evidence from Indonesia.
J Popul Econ 17(4):603–626
Putnam R (1993) Making democracy work: civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton University
Press, Princeton
Train K (2002) Discrete choice methods with simulation. Cambridge University Press, New York
